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Update TODO
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TODO.md
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TODO.md
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@ -7,9 +7,7 @@
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## aquatic_http
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## aquatic_http
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* handshake stuff
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* handshake stuff
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* fix overcomplicated and probably incorrect implementation
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* fix overcomplicated and possibly incorrect implementation
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* support TLS and plain at the same time??
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* really close connections after sending response??
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* fixed size buffer is probably bad
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* fixed size buffer is probably bad
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* compact peer representation in announce response: is implementation correct?
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* compact peer representation in announce response: is implementation correct?
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* scrape info hash parsing: multiple ought to be accepted
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* scrape info hash parsing: multiple ought to be accepted
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@ -110,6 +108,12 @@ just like best results in last benchmark, multiple client ips=true:
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* target-cpu=skylake: 439k
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* target-cpu=skylake: 439k
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* no target-cpu set: 388k
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* no target-cpu set: 388k
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## aquatic_http / aquatic_ws
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* Shared state for HTTP with and without TLS. Peers who announce over TLS
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should be able to expect that someone snooping on the connection can't
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connect them to a info hash. If someone receives their IP in a response
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while announcing without TLS, this expectation would be broken.
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## aquatic_udp
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## aquatic_udp
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* Other HashMap hashers (such as SeaHash): seemingly not worthwhile, see
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* Other HashMap hashers (such as SeaHash): seemingly not worthwhile, see
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